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The Relationship Between Tenure and Outside 
Director Task Involvement: A Social Identity 
Perspective
Dennis B. Veltrop






Drawing from corporate governance research and social identity theory, the authors argue that 
the relationship between outside directors’ time in office and outside director task involvement is 
more complex than generally anticipated. By using a unique multisource data set composed of 
peer ratings provided by fellow outside directors rating a focal director’s task involvement, this 
study analyzes director task involvement at the individual director level of analysis. The authors 
propose and empirically demonstrate that outside director tenure has an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with outside director task involvement that is moderated by a director’s social iden-
tification with the organization. As such, the authors demonstrate that social identification with 
the organization provides a critical contingency for the curvilinear relationship between outside 
director tenure and outside director task involvement. Findings suggest that outside directors 
who socially identify with the organization are more likely to grow “stale in the saddle” at lower 
levels of tenure. These findings provide support for the merit of analyzing outside directors at the 
individual level of analysis and suggest that a “one-size-fits-all” approach may not be most 
appropriate in assessing the effects of tenure on outside director functioning.
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Introduction
Large-scale corporate failures and the financial crisis of 2008 have placed boards of direc-
tors at the center of the corporate governance debate (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010; 
Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Stiles & Taylor, 2001). Outside directors play a prominent 
role in corporate governance and strategic decision making (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; 
Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Residing at the apex of the organization, outside directors are 
expected to monitor, evaluate, and advise senior management and ensure that senior manage-
ment best serves the interests of the organization (Daily et al.; Finkelstein & Mooney; Kor & 
Sundaramurthy; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).1 Recent calls to limit outside director tenure 
reflect the importance of outside directors in corporate governance. Regulators in both 
European (e.g., the United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands)2 and non-European countries 
(e.g., India, Malaysia, Singapore), as well as various corporate bodies in the United States 
(e.g., Calpers, the National Association of Corporate Directors), advocate to limit outside 
director tenure, assuming that longer tenured outside directors do not adequately scrutinize 
managerial decision. While these calls reflect the belief that outside directors grow entrenched 
over the course of their tenure, it is important to realize that the field still knows relatively 
little about the nature of the relationship between a director’s time in office and his or her task 
involvement in board duties (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013).
Some have noted that longer tenured outside directors accumulate greater experience and 
knowledge about the firm and are therefore better able to fulfill their tasks as outside direc-
tors (Beasley, 1996; Kosnik, 1990; Vafeas, 2003). Others, however, argue that longer tenured 
outside directors become entrenched (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; 
Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2011; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009), implying 
that directors develop fixated and stable cognitive schemas (cf. Dane, 2010) that may nega-
tively affect directors’ involvement in board duties because they are less receptive to deviat-
ing internal and external signals. Accordingly, Johnson et al. (2013) have hinted at the 
likelihood of a curvilinear relationship between director tenure and involvement in board 
duties, suggesting that there is an inflection point at which the negative effects of tenure start 
to outweigh the positive effects. In this article, we offer a theoretical rationale for this curvi-
linear relationship and explain why some directors exhibit higher levels of involvement in 
board duties over the course of their tenure than others.
Traditionally director entrenchment is implicitly equated with a reduced involvement in 
board duties. A key premise of this article, however, is that while longer tenured outside 
directors may grow entrenched, they may still be actively involved in their board duties, in 
terms of monitoring, evaluating, and advising senior management. In this article, we argue 
that outside director entrenchment should not be equated with reduced involvement in board 
duties. Rather, director entrenchment mirrors a cognitive state in which directors are unable 
to break established cognitive patterns (also see Guilford, 1967) and are less likely to con-
sider solution alternatives to these fixated and stable cognitive patterns. It is important to 
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realize, however, that these fixated and stable cognitive patterns may very well deviate from 
organizational norms and values. The actual internalization of organizational norms and 
values by a director is not implied by entrenchment but is captured by a director’s social 
identification with the organization (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008; Cooper & 
Thatcher, 2010; Mael & Ashforth, 1995; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). 
Entrenched directors who strongly socially identify with the organization will have stable 
cognitive patterns, and these cognitive patterns are also likely to be in line with the prevail-
ing organizational norms and values. Drawing from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978), we 
therefore propose that entrenchment is most likely to reduce directors’ proclivity to inde-
pendently monitor, evaluate, and advise senior management for directors who strongly 
socially identify with the organization. Outside directors who strongly socially identify with 
the organization are more likely to accept the prevailing organizational norms and values 
and “go with the flow.”
Interestingly, governance research has predominantly highlighted the positive effects of 
organizational identification for both CEOs (Boivie, Lange, McDonald, & Westphal, 2011) 
and outside directors (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008) by emphasizing that CEOs 
and directors who strongly socially identify with the organization are more motivated to 
contribute to the success of the organization. This study therefore contributes to the nascent 
literature on outside director functioning as well as more generally to extant governance 
research by showing that a strong social identification with the organization may also have 
reverse implications for director task involvement because, as a result of internalization of 
organizational norms and values, outside directors are less likely to question the prevailing 
course of action and to independently assess senior management strategic decision making.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this study provides the first empirical analysis of 
outside director involvement in board duties at the individual director level of analysis. To 
date, director characteristics are generally consolidated to board-level constructs (e.g., board 
tenure) and then related to company data to infer director and board functioning. Several 
scholars have warned that employing such aggregate units of analysis may overlook and 
confound differential effects of individual directors within the board (Finkelstein, Hambrick, 
& Cannella, 2009; Jensen & Zajac, 2004) and that inquiries that parse out director effects are 
needed to advance governance research (Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Johnson et al., 2013). By 
using a unique multisource data set composed of peer ratings provided by fellow outside 
directors rating a focal director’s involvement in board duties, we are able to show that the 
relationship between tenure and director involvement in board duties is curvilinear and con-
tingent on a director’s social identification with the organization—a relationship that would 
be difficult to assess by employing distal organizational-level measures (Johnson et al.).
Theory and Hypotheses
Outside Director Involvement in Board Duties
While there is no “one-size-fits-all” description of outside directors’ board duties, there seems 
to be consensus among both academics and practitioners that outside directors’ key responsibili-
ties involve oversight and the provision of advice. For instance, scholars adhering to agency 
theory emphasize that outside directors’ main duty is to scrutinize strategic initiatives proposed 
by senior management (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Westphal, 1999). 
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This involves specific duties, such as exercising oversight of the formulation and implementa-
tion of strategy as well as structuring remuneration and evaluating senior management. Yet other 
scholars and legislators note that a crucial duty for outside directors involves providing senior 
management with independent advice on strategic issues (Hillman et al., 2011; Minichilli, 
Zattoni, Nielsen, & Huse, 2012). Overall, we define director task involvement as demonstrating 
monitoring, evaluating, and advising behavior towards senior management (cf. McDonald & 
Westphal, 2010; also see Westphal). As such, we interpret director task involvement as fulfill-
ment of board duties, which consist of oversight of the formulation and implementation of strat-
egy, evaluation of senior management, and the provision of independent advice and counsel to 
senior management (cf. Hillman et al.; Minichilli et al.).
Outside Director Tenure and Involvement in Board Duties
Newly appointed outside directors start their tenure with a firm-specific knowledge deficit 
and steadily acquire a greater understanding about the firm and its processes. That is, com-
pared to senior management and incumbent outside directors, newly appointed outside direc-
tors start with a disadvantage in terms of facts, trends, information, and procedures related to 
the successful conduct of outside directors in the firm (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; 
Musteen, Datta, & Kemmerer, 2010; Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005). As outside director 
tenure increases, directors accumulate greater experience and knowledge about the firm; 
therefore, their capacity to perform their duties increases as their information asymmetry vis-
à-vis senior management is reduced (Beasley, 1996; Kosnik, 1990; Vafeas, 2003). The exper-
tise from extended tenure builds knowledge of a firm’s processes (Fischer & Pollock, 2004) 
and enables outside directors to monitor, evaluate, and provide senior management with 
valuable advice (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Kosnik, 1987).
Meanwhile, the traditional perspective on tenure is characterized by Katz (1982), who 
suggests that high levels of tenure are associated with entrenchment (i.e., with greater rigid-
ity in decision making and limited awareness of alternative solutions; see also Golden & 
Zajac, 2001; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993). According to the decision-
making literature, entrenched persons prefer information that is consistent with decisions 
they have previously made. Such information is perceived as more important and relied on 
more than new information that conflicts with existing ideas (Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 
2003). Similar to observations about executive directors within top management teams 
(Hambrick et al.; Kor, 2006; Miller, 1991) is the argument that longer tenured outside direc-
tors are likely to grow entrenched (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Walsh & Seward, 1990) as they develop fixated and stable cognitive schemas about 
organizational strategic decision making (cf. Dane, 2010). Given the complexity directors 
face, directors are expected to rely heavily on the cognitive schemas or “knowledge struc-
tures” in evaluating strategic decision making (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Possessing 
fixated cognitive schemas implies that directors become less sensitive and susceptible to 
deviating new information. Extended tenure is likely to result in reduced receptiveness to 
outside information and increased commitment to the status quo. This includes resistance to 
major changes in the firm’s strategic direction (cf. Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009), thereby reducing directors’ tendency to take action and, thus, reduc-
ing their task involvement within the board (Carpenter & Westphal; Golden & Zajac; 
Hambrick et al.; Hillman et al., 2011).
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The above discussion suggests that outside director tenure is associated with an inherent 
trade-off between expertise and entrenchment: Longer tenured outside directors may benefit 
from deep knowledge of the firm but suffer from entrenchment. Pfeffer (1983) already noted 
that although the length of an individual’s tenure contributes to job-specific knowledge, 
openness to new ideas is highest when someone first joins the organization. Given that the 
most extensive learning about an organization takes place in the early years of tenure and that 
experiential knowledge of a firm is vital for directors to perform their tasks (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Kor, 2006), outside directors are most likely 
to benefit from increased tenure in their early years, in which experiential learning within the 
organization enables them to monitor, evaluate, and advise senior management. Extended 
tenure of outside directors is then likely to lead to entrenchment and a reduced openness to 
deviating ideas. Accordingly, if director tenure paces two processes, one involving the acqui-
sition of firm-specific knowledge, the second involving director entrenchment in later years, 
we expect that director involvement first rises and then falls with increasing director tenure.
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between outside director tenure and outside director task involve-
ment is curvilinear (inverted U shaped), with maximum task involvement occurring at interme-
diate levels of outside director tenure.
The next question then becomes, at what point do the negative effects of director tenure on 
director task involvement start to outweigh the positive effects? The answer, we propose, is 
contingent on an outside director’s social identification with the organization. Whereas some 
governance scholars consider organizational tenure and social identification as quite similar 
constructs, it is critical to note that whereas tenure with the organization may be positively 
associated with organizational identification, it should not be equated with it. Indeed, a meta-
analysis by Riketta (2005) shows that tenure with organizations is only weakly correlated 
with organizational identification,3 corroborating the notion that organizational identification 
and organizational tenure are clearly separate constructs and that tenure does not automati-
cally imply organizational identification (see also Ashforth et al., 2008; Mael & Ashforth, 
1995). Specifically, social identification with the organization produces a host of organiza-
tion-based attitudes and behaviors, including two phenomena that are most important for 
outside director functioning: organization-oriented motivation to further the organization’s 
interest and susceptibility to influence from fellow organizational members (cf. van 
Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003), which includes senior management as prototypical organiza-
tional members. In the following, we discuss the moderating role of social identification with 
the organization for the relationship between director tenure and outside director task involve-
ment by pointing to two important consequences of social identification with the organiza-
tion: a high motivation to contribute to the success of the organization and a reduced proclivity 
to independently assess senior management strategic decision making.
Social Identification With the Organization
Tajfel defines social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives 
from a person’s knowledge of his or her membership of a social group together with the 
value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (1978: 63). Social identifi-
cation describes a process where individuals come to see themselves as interchangeable 
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exemplars of a social group rather than as unique individuals (Turner, 1982). Social identi-
fication with the organization can then be described as the extent to which individuals define 
themselves in terms of a specific organization (Ashforth et al., 2008; Cooper & Thatcher, 
2010). This self-conception in terms of “we” rather than “I” is referred to as social identity 
and implies a psychological merging of self and organization (Brewer, 1991; van 
Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006).
Past research has shown that persons who identify strongly with the organization are 
highly motivated to contribute to the success of that organization (for overviews, see Ashforth 
et al., 2008; Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Newly appointed outside directors will have little 
knowledge about specific organizational issues and, therefore, are in a disadvantaged posi-
tion to perform their tasks successfully (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Musteen et al., 2010; 
Roberts et al., 2005). New outside directors who strongly socially identify with the organiza-
tion are likely to be motivated to obtain relevant information about the organization, to 
engage in experiential learning, and to acquire knowledge of the firm’s environment and its 
stakeholders. Learning about the organization will enable new directors to assess strategic 
decision making (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; but also see Kosnik, 1987). Alternatively, for 
new directors who identify weakly with the organization, it may take more time to learn 
about the organization as a result of lower motivation to contribute to the organization. So we 
agree with Hillman et al. (2008) that organizational identification may contribute to outside 
directors’ task involvement. However, we also note that according to the general principles 
of the learning curve (e.g., Yelle, 1979), this advantage of a strong organizational identifica-
tion in terms of acquiring firm-specific knowledge will be there merely in the first period 
after being appointed.
While perceiving organizational norms as appropriate may stimulate the overall level of 
task involvement for regular employees within organizations, for outside directors, this is 
less likely because independently assessing organizational affairs and managerial decision 
making is a core—if not the most important—characteristic of directors’ tasks (Carter & 
Lorsch, 2004; Roberts et al., 2005; Westphal & Graebner, 2010; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010). 
Particularly relevant for outside director functioning is that social identification with the 
organization may render outside directors conducive to organizational norms and values (cf. 
Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003), implying that direc-
tors’ individual perceptions, evaluations, and actions are more likely to be informed by pre-
vailing organizational values and norms and less likely to be formed by unique individuating 
characteristics (Brewer, 1991; Haslam, Ryan, Postmes, Spears, Jetten, & Webley, 2006; 
Hogg & Terry, 2000; Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987). As a result, outside directors who 
strongly socially identify with the organization are more likely to “go with the flow” and 
conform to organizational norms and values.
It is then important to realize that outside directors who strongly socially identify with 
the organization are more likely not only to conform to these organizational norms and val-
ues but also to have turned to prototypical organizational members for information about 
these organizational norms and values (cf. Turner et al., 1987). Prototypicality refers to the 
extent to which individuals are considered exemplary representatives of, in our case, the 
organization (Hogg, 2001). The idea that senior management shapes organizational norms 
and values is well established in upper echelon research (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). As the top-level leaders of the organization, senior management epitomizes 
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the norms and values of the organization as a collective and can therefore be considered as 
highly prototypical (also see Bandura, 1987). As directors identify more strongly with the 
organization, senior management acts as an increasing influential basis for shaping social 
norms that guide outside directors’ behavior (cf. Hogg; Turner et al.). Furthermore, as out-
side members of the organization that operate on a part-time episodical basis in carrying out 
their board duties (Forbes & Milliken, 1999), outside directors generally have very limited 
interaction with other organizational members besides senior management, and senior man-
agement is therefore centrally located to act as the key source of information and opinions 
about the organization (Dalton et al., 2007).
Outside directors who strongly identify with the organization will be more positive about 
senior management—such as the CEO as well as other senior management members—not on 
the basis of the personal qualities of these managers but, rather, because they see them as 
representative prototypical members of the organization (Hogg, 2001; Sluss, Ployhart, Cobb, 
& Ashforth, 2011). In addition, while it would be implausible for outside directors to socially 
identify with senior management as a social group, because outside directors are not part of 
that group, the organization may act as a shared or overarching social identity for outside 
directors to which both outside directors and senior management belong. Such an overarch-
ing identity produces a pro-in-group bias towards senior management as fellow organiza-
tional members (cf. Ashforth et al., 2008; Eggins, Haslam, & Reynolds, 2002; Gaertner, 
Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994; Gómez, Dovidio, Huici, Gaertner, & Cuadrado, 
2008). Social identification with the organization would foster outside directors to view 
senior management in stereotypical terms as more trustworthy and possessing similar values, 
goals, and attitudes (cf. Brewer, 1991; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Tajfel, 1978; van Knippenberg 
& Hogg, 2003). As a result, outside directors who socially identify with the organization are 
more likely to be positive about senior management as prototypical organizational members 
(Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Tajfel, 1982), and they are more likely to interpret strate-
gic decisions made by senior management as appropriate.
In sum, if high levels of tenure are associated with entrenchment indicating a diminished 
capacity to deviate from established cognitive schemas, and if social identification with the 
organization implies internalizing organizational norms and values that are signaled by senior 
management, leading to a reduced proclivity to independently assess senior management 
strategic decision making, we expect social identification to reduce director involvement at 
high levels of tenure. That is, socially identified directors at high levels of tenure are unlikely 
to deviate from their fixated and established cognitive schemas, are more likely to have 
accorded these cognitive schemas with the organizational in-group prototype, and have a 
lower proclivity to monitor, evaluate, and independently advise senior management because 
they interpret senior management decision making as appropriate. Conversely, outside direc-
tors who weakly socially identify with the organization are less likely to accord their views 
with the organizational in-group prototype. As such, also at high levels of tenure, these direc-
tors would still be expected to actively monitor, evaluate, and advise senior management. 
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2: Outside director social identification with the organization will moderate the curvilinear 
relationship between outside director tenure and outside director task involvement, such that the 
negative effect of high levels of tenure is stronger for high identifiers than for low identifiers.
452  Journal of Management / February 2018
Method
Research Setting
Our research relies on data gathered from boards of directors at Dutch housing corpora-
tions. The main tasks of Dutch housing corporations are to build, rent, and maintain afford-
able housing. Board scholars often remark that gaining access is one of the most challenging 
aspects of research on boards and have offered various suggestions to overcome this impedi-
ment (e.g., Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Westphal & Stern, 2007). In this vein, involving stock 
listed companies in our research would have been more difficult because any publicity 
around director functioning in such firms could affect share prices and/or could have litigious 
consequences. At the time we conducted our study, the functioning of boards at Dutch hous-
ing corporations received considerable attention of the Dutch government, the housing cor-
poration sector, and the Dutch Association of Outside Directors of Housing Corporations 
(Vereniging van Toezichthouders in Woningcorporaties, or VTW; e.g., Algemene Rekenkamer, 
2008; VTW, 2011). Research on boards of housing corporations was—and still is—considered to 
be a particularly relevant topic for investigation in the policy debate. The VTW specifically 
indicates that board functioning remains a key focus area. As such, we obtained endorsement 
from the VTW, and we agreed to communicate our research findings.
The first housing corporations were established around 1850 to provide housing to under-
privileged segments of the Dutch population. The current Dutch housing policy is still based 
on the idea that affordable housing should be universally accessible and includes housing at 
prime locations to prevent social segregation. While rents are kept low nowadays through 
governmental oversight and regulation, housing corporations have been autonomous and 
financially independent enterprises since 1995, when the Dutch government decided to 
privatize all housing corporations.4 As financially independent organizations, these housing 
corporations have to make a return on their investments to ensure their survival. When we 
collected our data, there were 430 housing corporations in the Netherlands with 2.4 million 
houses and a total capital of 32.6 billion euros (42.3 billion USD).5 Similar to Dutch listed 
firms, Dutch housing corporations have a two-tier structure in which the management board 
(which includes the CEO) is formally separated from the supervisory board composed of 
outside directors. The tasks that outside directors perform within a supervisory board are 
similar to the tasks of the outside members within the one-tier structure. For matters of par-
simony, we refer to supervisory board members as directors and to the management board as 
senior management.
Sample and Procedure
As indicated, gaining access to boards is one of the most challenging aspects of research 
on boards. To a priori increase the likelihood of gaining access to boards of housing corpora-
tions, we followed several steps recommended by Leblanc and Schwartz (2007) and Westphal 
and Stern (2007). First, we obtained endorsement from the VTW. The VTW sent out letters 
to the 100 largest housing corporations in the Netherlands and to the chairpersons of the 
supervisory boards of these corporations. The letter informed the chairpersons that we would 
contact them to discuss the overall purpose of the research project. To foster commitment 
from the chairpersons, we organized face-to-face meetings with them to explain the purpose 
of our research and to assure absolute confidentiality. Thirty-two chairpersons indicated that 
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they were willing to schedule an appointment with us. Thirty chairpersons agreed to partici-
pate in this research project. We subsequently asked these chairpersons to endorse our 
research for the other directors on the board. Within a few days after each face-to-face meet-
ing, we sent access codes to all directors on the board; these access codes could be used to 
log in to a secured website through which outside directors could rate their fellow directors 
and answer questions about themselves.
Second, to improve the appearance and face validity of the online survey instrument, we 
pretested the online questionnaire on two boards of directors that were not included in this 
research project. Moreover, we sent two further personal reminders to nonrespondents. Of 
the 181 directors from the 30 participating boards who received a personal access code for 
the Web site, 154 directors (85%) completed the questionnaire. The average age was 58 years 
(SD = 7.9), and 27% were female. All directors were assured absolute confidentiality in rat-
ing their peers; they were informed that their answers would not be made available to their 
fellow directors under any circumstances.
To assess the representativeness of the sample, we compared director and firm character-
istics in the final sample with those excluded from the final sample because of nonresponse 
or missing data. Specifically, and consistent with, for instance, Westphal and Bednar (2005), 
we used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test, which indicates whether the distribu-
tions of a variable for two samples are comparable. This test did not reveal any statistically 
significant differences between the participating and nonparticipating housing corporations 
for our sample in terms of size (measured as the number of houses owned and number of 
employees working for the housing corporation), board size (i.e., number of directors), aver-
age director age, and average director tenure; p values ranged from .12 to .96. We also com-
pared the characteristics of the 154 responding versus the 27 nonresponding directors of the 
30 participating housing corporations. We did not find any statistically significant differences 
between the directors in the two samples in terms of age, gender, and tenure (the lowest p 
value was .64 based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test).
Measures
Outside director task involvement. Outside directors make complex decisions in oversee-
ing and evaluating managerial decision making and providing management with independent 
advice (Carter & Lorsch, 2004; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Moreover, boards meet episodi-
cally, face complex and multifaceted tasks, and produce output that is entirely cognitive in 
nature (Forbes & Milliken; Minichilli et al., 2012). Given the complex nature of outside 
directors’ tasks, we follow prior work in management and applied psychology (Campbell, 
1990; Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993) and interpret director involvement as the 
involvement in directors’ task behaviors as rated by fellow directors.
In the Netherlands, as in other countries, outside directors are legally obliged to monitor 
senior management, evaluate senior management, and provide senior management with 
advice (Principle III.1, Dutch Corporate Governance Code). Also in other countries, moni-
toring, evaluating, and advising senior management are generally included in corporate law 
as outside directors’ fiduciary responsibility and are referred to as such by a host of board 
scholars (e.g., Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Roberts et al., 2005; Westphal, 
1999). In this vein, it is important to note that the distinction between these activities is often 
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blurred (cf. Demb & Neubauer; Kroll et al.; Lorsch & MacIver; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003) and that the distinction between these task behaviors is more 
apparent than real in the actual work that outside directors do. Because monitoring, evaluat-
ing, and advising senior management collectively reflect outside directors’ fiduciary respon-
sibility and because it is difficult to separate these tasks, they need to be interpreted 
collectively as interdependent core ingredients of outside directors’ board duties.
We measured individual outside director task involvement using peer ratings that we 
aggregated to the mean for each individual director. As a result of the labor intense nature of 
using a peer ratings approach for directors (every director rated all other directors individu-
ally), we were forced to keep our instrument as short as possible. Because director task 
involvement is interpreted as a reflective measure in which director involvement in task 
behaviors captures director task involvement in its entirety (see Edwards, 2011, for an 
account on the use of reflective and formative measures), it was acceptable to select three out 
of the six items from Westphal (1999) that had the highest pretest face validity and most 
closely resembled directors’ legal task requirements (i.e., their fiduciary responsibilities), 
and we adapted these items to the individual director level. As indicated, Dutch law pre-
scribes directors to monitor the policies of senior management, to evaluate the senior man-
agement, and to assist senior management with advice. The following task behaviors were 
included as indicators of outside director task involvement: “To what extent does ‘this direc-
tor’ monitor top management strategic decision making?” “To what extent is ‘this director’ 
involved in formally evaluating top management?” and “To what extent is ‘this director’ a 
sounding board for management?” For these items, “this director” was replaced by the name 
of the focal director to be rated by his or her fellow directors. These three items were mea-
sured on a 7-point scale (1 = minimally, 7 = very much so), and Cronbach’s alpha was .83. An 
exploratory factor analysis suggested a one-factor solution that explained 76% of the vari-
ance, indicating that the items load on a single factor and constitute a single measure of out-
side director task involvement.
Organizational identification. Organizational identification was measured with four out 
of six items from Mael and Ashforth (1992). We excluded two items that were identified by 
outside directors to have low face validity in the pretest of the questionnaire. We included the 
following items: “When someone criticizes this organization, it feels like a personal insult”; 
“When I talk about this organization, I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’”; “This organiza-
tion’s successes are my successes”; and “When someone praises this organization, it feels 
like a personal compliment.” Outside directors rated their organizational identification on a 
7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), and Cronbach’s alpha was .70.
Director tenure. We define director tenure as the length of a director’s tenure in the orga-
nization. The participating organizations were legally obliged to publish information on their 
board of directors in their annual accounts. Information on director tenure was obtained from 
the annual reports of the participating organization in combination with additional informa-
tion from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. Tenure was measured in months; to ease inter-
pretation, we divided tenure by 12 to arrive at a measure of tenure in years.
Control variables. To control for unobserved heterogeneity across boards, we tested 
our hypotheses with a fixed effect model that includes 29 board dummy variables. At the 
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individual director level, we controlled for a director’s appointments at other organizations 
by including the log of a director’s number of appointments. We included a chairperson 
dummy to control for the position of the chairperson. Because membership of the audit 
committee may give directors an information advantage to carry out their board duties, we 
also controlled for the effect of being on the audit committee. We included a dummy for 
the chair position of the audit committee and a dummy for regular membership of the audit 
committee. Not every audit committee is assigned a formal chair, however. In absence 
of a formal chair, we categorized all audit committee members as regular members. In 
addition, while almost every board has an audit committee, there are other committees 
that vary across boards (e.g., governance committee, agenda committee, human resources 
committee); we therefore included a dummy that captures whether a director is a member 
of another committee besides the audit committee.6 This information was gathered from 
the annual reports.
A director’s level of expertise is likely to affect a director’s task involvement (e.g., Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003); we therefore also controlled for managerial expertise and sector-specific 
expertise. Managerial expertise was measured with three items asking directors about their 
level of “financial-economic expertise,” “internal control and administrative organizational 
expertise,” and “general business and organizational expertise.” Cronbach’s alpha was .73. 
Sector-specific expertise was measured with three items: “care and well-being expertise,” 
“safety and habitability expertise,” and “residential expertise.” These items reflect that a 
general objective of housing corporations in the Netherlands is to ensure that households 
have access to adequate and affordable housing and that housing corporations should con-
tribute to the quality of life in neighborhoods. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .76. All 
expertise items were measured on a 7-point scale asking directors about their level of exper-
tise (1 = very low, 7 = very high).
Aggregation of Outside Director Peer Ratings
Because we used a peer ratings approach to provide a proximal measure of outside direc-
tor task involvement, it is important to evaluate a focal director’s task involvement with 
respect to the measurement assumption that the responses from fellow directors converged 
(Bliese, 2000). To investigate this, we calculated James, Demaree, and Wolf’s (1984, 1993) 
average interagreement coefficient for multi-item indices (rwg (j)). Compared with a uniform 
distribution, the median rwg (j) value for task involvement was .89 (mean = .83). In addition, 
compared with a heavily skewed distribution, the median rwg (j) value reads .67 (mean = .72; 
see LeBreton & Senter, 2008), which can still be considered as adequate. Additionally, we 
would expect variations between the ratings of director task involvement for a focal director 
to be more similar to one another than the ratings of task involvement for other directors 
(Bliese). This was investigated by calculating the intraclass correlation coefficients, that is, 
ICC(1) and ICC(2) (Bliese). One-way analysis of variance suggested that ratings differed 
significantly between different focal outside directors. The ICC(1) for task involvement was 
.35 (p < .001). The reliability of the aggregated means for the individual director level was 
investigated by calculating the ICC(2). The ICC(2) for director task involvement was .66. 
These numbers indicate that there was sufficient agreement to justify aggregation (Bliese; 
LeBreton & Senter). All in all, these results support the aggregation of peer ratings of director 
task involvement for individual directors.
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Analytical Methodology
A Hausman specification test suggested that a multilevel fixed effect model is preferred to 
a random effect model. Fixed effect models have the advantage of controlling for constant 
unobserved board effects across boards that may explain differences in the dependent vari-
able. Fixed effect models are conservative for our analyses, since only changes in indepen-
dent variables within a particular board may result in a significant effect. We also tested our 
hypotheses with a fixed effect regression employing the Huber/White sandwich estimator for 
variance that is robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity (see White, 1980; Williams, 2000). Our 
results remained unchanged. Following the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991), we 
standardized all variables involved in computing the interaction terms. With respect to the 
interaction term, our hypotheses involve a curvilinear relationship between director tenure 
and director task involvement that exists at all levels of organizational identification, but 
organizational identification interacts with director tenure in determining director task 
involvement. To test the moderating effect of organizational identification on the curvilinear 
relationship between director tenure and director task involvement, we estimated the follow-
ing fixed effects regression model, including a linear by linear interaction term (cf. Aiken & 
West; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Although some scholars test such hypotheses by 
including an interaction term between the moderator and the squared term, it only makes 
sense to do so when it is hypothesized that the form of the curvilinear relationship (i.e., the 
second derivative) changes (e.g., becomes more linear) for different values of the moderator. 
The hypothesis that the negative effects of outside director tenure are more severe for outside 
directors who socially identify with the organization encompasses a significant linear by 
linear interaction between tenure and organizational identification (besides a significant qua-
dratic tenure term) and not a change in the form of the curvilinear relationship between ten-
ure and task involvement (see the following equation):
y x x z x z eit it it it it it it t it= + + + + + +β β β β ω1 2 2 3 4 ν
where indices i and t stand for, respectively, director i in board t,ωit  is a vector of control 
variables and νt  the board-level fixed effects to be estimated. The curvilinear effects of 
tenure are estimated by including a linear xit  and a quadratic term x it
2 .  The hypothesized 
moderating effect of organizational identification zit  on the relationship between tenure and 
outside director task involvement is captured by the interaction term x zit it , and a negative 
sign for β4  would indicate that the maximum level of director task involvement will occur 
earlier in a director’s tenure to the extent that a director identifies with the organization.
Results
The means, standard deviations, and Pearson zero-order correlations between the variables 
are presented in Table 1. As shown, the chairperson dummy, managerial expertise, and tenure 
are positively related to director task involvement, and there is a positive relationship between 
the chairperson dummy and managerial expertise. Also, the chairperson is more likely to be 
on other committees besides the audit committee. The correlation coefficient between organi-
zational identification and tenure indicates that tenure and organizational identification are 
moderately positively correlated (i.e., they have slightly less than 5% variance in common). 
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Furthermore, the chairperson dummy and director tenure are positively related, and the nega-
tive correlation between tenure and the number of appointments indicates that longer tenured 
directors have on average fewer additional board appointments. Managerial expertise is posi-
tively related to organizational identification and negatively related to sector-specific 
expertise.
Table 2 presents the results of the regression analyses used to test our hypotheses. We 
included five models to isolate the contributions of the different terms. We included the con-
trol variables in Model 1. In Model 2, we included the linear term of director tenure, and we 
added the squared term of director tenure in Model 3. The moderator organizational identifi-
cation was added in Model 4, followed by the interaction between director tenure and orga-
nizational identification in Model 5.
We find support for the curvilinear inverted U-shaped relationship between director ten-
ure and director task involvement as hypothesized in the first hypothesis. The results from 
Table 2 show that the coefficient of the linear term is positive (Model 3, b = 0.17, p < .05) and 
the squared term is negative (Model 3, b = –0.12, p < .05). This means that “on average,” 
tenure is positively related to director task involvement but also that for higher levels of ten-
ure, this relationship becomes less positive or even negative. Moreover, consistent with our 
second hypothesis, the results support an interaction effect between tenure and organizational 
identification (Model 5, b = –0.12, p < .05). The negative effects for higher levels of tenure 
become more pronounced for directors who strongly identify with the organization. To gain 
further insight into the nature of this interaction effect, we plotted the curvilinear relationship 
between director tenure and director task involvement at two different levels (1 SD above the 
mean and 1 SD below the mean) of organizational identification (cf. Aiken & West, 1991). 
Table 1
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 1.  Number of 
appointments
4.16 2.07
 2. Chairperson dummy 0.18 0.38 .14
 3.  Member audit 
committee
0.18 0.38 −.08 −.08
 4. Chair audit committee 0.05 0.22 −.02 −.03 −.11
 5.  Membership other 
committees
0.36 0.48 −.12 .18* .01 .12
 6. Managerial expertise 5.07 0.96 .19* .24** .23** .21* .05
 7.  Sector-specific 
expertise
4.84 0.95 .00 .02 −.13 −.25** .08 −.18*
 8. Tenure 5.20 3.50 −.19* .17* −.02 .02 .01 .03 .11
 9.  Organizational 
identification
5.08 0.87 .10 .15 .01 .08 .07 −.22* −.02 .22**
10.  Director task 
involvement
5.21 0.82 .15 .44** .15 −.03 .05 .28* −.09 .18* .10
Note: N = 154.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
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The pattern of results depicted in Figure 1 is consistent with the second hypothesis in dem-
onstrating that the maximum level of director task involvement will occur earlier in a direc-
tor’s tenure for directors who strongly identify with the organization.
Robustness Checks
In addition to the results reported, we ran several robustness checks. In our main analyses, 
we control for, among other variables, the number of board appointments, being on the audit 
committee (both regular members and the audit committee chair position), and memberships 
of other committees. While these variables reflect the possibility that task involvement is 
affected by influence-related variables that have to do with prestige, expertise, and position 
Table 2
Results of Fixed Effect Regression for Director Task Involvement
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Number of appointments 
(log)
0.11† 0.14* 0.13* 0.13* 0.12†
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Chairman dummy 0.76** 0.69** 0.68** 0.69** 0.69**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Member audit committee 0.48** 0.50** 0.49** 0.48** 0.45**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Chair audit committee 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.01
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)
Membership other 
committees
0.29* 0.30* 0.29* 0.29* 0.29*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Managerial expertise 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Sector-specific expertise −0.11† −0.13* −0.13* −0.13* −0.14*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Tenure 0.14* 0.17** 0.18** 0.17**
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Tenure squared −0.12* −0.13* −0.11†
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Organizational identification −0.04 −0.02
 (0.06) (0.06)




Constant 4.88** 4.88** 4.98** 4.99** 5.00**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
R2 (within) .36 .39 .41 .41 .43
ΔR2 .36** .03* .02* .00 .02*
Observations 154 154 154 154 154
Number of boards  30  30  30  30  30
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within the board (e.g., Finkelstein, 1992), other director attributes may also confer influence. 
Therefore, we also examined the effects of including additional influence-related variables 
on our main results. On the basis of information gathered from annual reports, we performed 
analyses in which we controlled for whether a director has a management position at another 
organization, whether the director has or has had a position within the housing sector, and 
whether a director has or has had a political position. In addition, we performed analyses in 
which we controlled for a director’s gender and age. None of these additional variables had 
a significant effect in any of the analyses, while the results regarding our variables of interest 
remain substantively unchanged.7
Discussion
Our inquiry started with the observation that whereas outside directors are crucial for the 
governance of organizations, the corporate governance field still knows relatively little about 
the nature of the relationship between an outside director’s time in office and his or her func-
tioning within the board. As such, the field has presented conflicting results on the relation-
ship between outside director tenure and director functioning (Johnson et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, this study was designed to enhance our understanding of the relationship 
between outside director tenure and outside director functioning and, in particular, director 
involvement in board duties. By integrating governance research and social identity theory, 
we tested the proposition that outside director tenure has an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with director task involvement, which is likely to be contingent on a director’s social 
Figure 1
Curvilinear Relationship Between Tenure and Director Task Involvement for 
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identification with the organization. On one hand, our results suggest that longer tenured 
directors are more likely to have lower levels of task involvement. On the other hand, the 
results demonstrate that for outside directors who weakly socially identify with the organiza-
tion, high tenure is less likely to negatively affect their task involvement. These results indi-
cate that the relationship between outside director tenure and task involvement is more 
complex than generally anticipated and that a “one-size-fits-all” approach may not be most 
appropriate in assessing the effects of tenure on outside director functioning.
This study provides several important contributions to corporate governance research and 
practice. In the first place, a primary theoretical contribution is that entrenchment and social 
identification with the organization should be considered separate constructs, both of which 
are relevant for outside directors’ task involvement. Organizational identification involves a 
psychological merging of self and the organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton, 
Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; van Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006), which is not implied by 
high levels of tenure. By socially identifying with the organization, outside directors are 
more likely to adhere to organizational norms and values and interpret senior management as 
fellow prototypical organizational members. As such, our results indicate that outside direc-
tors who strongly socially identify with the organization have a lower proclivity to indepen-
dently assess senior management and to provide independent advice that deviates from the 
prevailing course of action. Particularly at high levels of tenure, socially identified outside 
directors are less likely to generate perspectives that deviate from internalized organizational 
norms and values. In sum, our results demonstrate that the relationship between outside 
director tenure and director task involvement is contingent on social identification with the 
organization. We believe that this is relevant for understanding board behavior, since outside 
directors have the fiduciary responsibility to perform their board duties.
Secondly, our theory and empirical findings challenge some of the current theoretical lit-
erature that integrates social identity theory with the literature on outside director functioning 
(e.g., Hillman et al., 2008; Withers, Corley, & Hillman, 2012). Our results suggest that outside 
director social identification with the organization, by itself, has no significant main effect on 
outside director task involvement. While we agree with the Hillman et al. pioneering theoreti-
cal account that organizational identification may have beneficial effects for outside director 
functioning in terms of fostering engagement towards the organization, we maintain that it is 
important to realize that organizational identification may also reduce directors’ proclivity to 
assess senior management. Arguably the most important task of outside directors is to inde-
pendently evaluate senior management strategic decision making (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; McDonald, Westphal, & Graebner, 2008; Roberts et al., 2005). 
Governance scholars have noted that outside directors who are psychologically detached from 
the organization are more likely to question and independently assess strategic decision mak-
ing (e.g., McNulty, 2013; Petrovic, 2008; Westphal & Bednar, 2005). In a similar vein, 
Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997) already asserted that scholars investigating boards of directors 
should be sensitive to when organizational identification should be considered a strength and 
when it should be considered a constraint for outside directors. Although we do not postulate 
performance effects for the organization as a whole, because our focus is on individual-level 
director task involvement, our theoretical framework explicitly acknowledges and our empiri-
cal findings corroborate that outside directors who socially identify with the organization are 
less likely to engage in board duties at high levels of tenure.
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Moreover, a close look at Figure 1 indicates that if organizational identification is high, 
not only do higher levels of involvement come at an earlier stage of tenure but also the maxi-
mum level of involvement is lower. In accordance with the rationale that social identification 
with the organization leads directors to internalize organizational norms and values and that 
this is most likely to reduce director task involvement at high levels of tenure when directors 
are unlikely to consider solution alternatives, Figure 1 shows that for strong identifiers, 
entrenchment effects are more severe. Figure 1 also suggests that in the case of low tenure, 
directors are more likely to benefit from social identification with the organization. An expla-
nation for this finding would be that social identification with the organization has a positive 
effect because it stimulates motivation and experiential learning, which in turn may increase 
a director’s initial task involvement (cf. Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hekman, Steensma, Bigley, 
& Hereford, 2009; Riketta, 2005). In sum, strong identifiers may benefit in the beginning, but 
the positive effects of tenure dissipate more quickly. Overall, this suggests a complex rela-
tionship between tenure and task involvement, which again supports our first conclusion that 
caution is needed when such relationships are analyzed at the board level.
A third and final contribution of this study is that it is the first empirical study that ana-
lyzes outside directors at the individual level. Notwithstanding the important role of outside 
directors, it is surprising to note that while our “knowledge of top executives continues to 
grow . . . , we know little about nonexecutive or outside directors” (Hambrick, Werder, & 
Zajac, 2008: 384). As such, several researchers have acknowledged that the inconclusive 
findings in linking board characteristics to board-level outcomes are partially resulting from 
insufficient consideration of the involvement of individual directors rather than the board as 
a monolithic entity (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hillman et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 
2013; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Indeed, our results suggest that a 
possible explanation for the ambiguous results for outside director tenure is that outside 
director tenure has nonlinear and contingent effects that are difficult to uncover at the board 
level of analysis. Our findings thus contribute to a better understanding of outside director 
functioning at the individual level of analysis by demonstrating that outside director tenure 
does matter, but they also indicate that a “one-size-fits-all” approach is unlikely to be most 
appropriate in assessing the implications of outside director tenure on director task 
involvement.
In addition to the theoretical and empirical contributions, this study brings new implica-
tions for practice and policy. An implication of our results for practice is that practitioners 
and regulatory bodies need to be aware that a “one-size-fits-all” approach may not be most 
suitable for gauging the effects of outside director tenure. Our results indicate that the rela-
tionship between tenure and outside director task involvement is likely to be contingent on 
other factors, one of them being the extent to which a director socially identifies with the 
organization. To take this contingency into account, in evaluating the functioning of indi-
vidual outside directors, the chairperson or an external facilitator can incorporate scales to 
garner insight into a director’s social identification with the organization. Outside directors 
who weakly socially identify with the organization are less likely to have entrenchment affect 
their task involvement, while outside directors who strongly socially identify may need to 
pay particular attention to not have their task involvement reduced by complacency with 
organizational norms and values as their tenure progresses. Specifically addressing this in 
evaluations and discussions will likely affect the board culture in the sense that it will make 
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individual outside directors, as well as the board as a whole, conscious about their duties of 
monitoring, evaluating, and advising senior management.
A related policy implication of this research is that regulators can set dynamic term limits 
for outside director tenure. Specifically, whereas prescriptions and best practice provisions 
related to director independence and tenure are included in national corporate governance 
codes across the globe (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), regulators might pay more atten-
tion to more proximal and individual-level behavioral aspects of outside director functioning, 
such as a director’s social identification with the organization. We do realize, however, that 
it may be difficult to adequately capture behavioral aspects in (soft) regulation. Nevertheless, 
an awareness of the possible pitfalls of uniform tenure requirements is relevant for informing 
the policy debate. The importance of such individual-level practical implications becomes 
clear when we realize that outside directors reside at the apex of organizations and that we 
know relatively little about outside directors at the individual level. Nonetheless, history has 
shown that complacent outside directors may have serious ramifications for the governance 
of organizations as a whole. Because this study provides one of the first empirical examina-
tions of outside directors as individuals, our study can be regarded only as a first and yet 
important step in exploring the determinants of individual outside director functioning.
Limitations and Future Directions
As with any study, there are limitations that should be acknowledged. Given the charac-
teristics of the study, caution should be exercised in interpreting and generalizing results 
from this study. Specifically, the cross-sectional design limits the ability to draw empirical 
conclusions about the direction of causality. Furthermore, it cannot be completely excluded 
that our results are to some extent driven by unobserved differences both at the board level 
and at the organization level of analysis and in the type of people who stay longer with an 
organization. Future research may include repeated measurements of social identification 
with the organization and director task involvement over time and incorporate longitudinal 
designs to possibly tackle these limitations. Given the difficulty of gaining access to boards 
of directors, this will, however, provide a serious challenge for future research.
Moreover, most organizations in the Netherlands have a two-tier board structure. 
Generalization to other countries with alternative institutional settings may pose a limitation 
of our current research project. Notwithstanding the formal difference between a one-tier and 
a two-tier board structure, the tasks that outside directors perform within a two-tier board are 
similar to the tasks that nonexecutive directors perform within a one-tier board (Bezemer, 
Maassen, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). A similar observation applies to the issue that 
our study is limited to one industry, namely, the housing industry. Although the institutional 
and industry context is important to take into consideration, and although we encourage 
researchers to further explore the effects of institutional contextual elements on board behav-
ior, we are confident that the results of this article can be generalized to boards of directors 
in other industry and institutional settings.
We incorporated multiple sources of data in our analysis. Specifically, director tenure was 
drawn from archival information, organizational identification was based on self-report data, 
and director task involvement was rated by fellow directors. Although this approach helps to 
alleviate concerns about common source bias, the use of additional measures for task 
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involvement (e.g., based on board minutes, observations of board meetings) would strengthen 
our confidence in these results. Unfortunately, we did not have access to such information, 
but future research may benefit from gauging individual director involvement from board 
minutes or observational studies (Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010).
We focused on outside director involvement in monitoring, evaluating, and advising 
senior management because it is outside directors’ fiduciary responsibility to fulfill these 
tasks. Interesting work could be done, however, on the relationship between outside director 
task involvement and outside director effectiveness. Excessive involvement by directors 
could overly constrain senior management. Depending on the corporate governance configu-
ration (e.g., Misangyi & Acharya, 2014), the optimal level of director involvement may very 
well differ. The effectiveness of boardroom activities and task involvement of individual 
directors is likely to be context dependent. For a more all-encompassing overview, the com-
plete configuration of director-specific, board-specific, firm-specific, and environment- 
specific characteristics should be considered simultaneously. This makes the relationship 
between director task involvement and director effectiveness a rather complex one and an 
important topic for future research. In this respect, disentangling the relationship between 
tenure, task involvement, and organizational identification is only a first attempt to improve 
our understanding of the functioning of outside directors. Studying the relationship between 
involvement in board duties and director effectiveness on one hand and organization-level 
consequences on the other hand could spur research into a virtually untouched, but critically 
important, field of investigation.
Future research may include mediating mechanisms. We argued that longer tenured 
directors are more likely to become entrenched. However, since we did not measure 
entrenchment directly, alternative explanations for a lower level of task involvement for 
longer tenured directors cannot be excluded. An at first sight plausible alternative explana-
tion, for example, might be that reduced task involvement over time simply reflects the 
learning curve. Indeed, according to this curve, learning about an organization will espe-
cially take place in the early years of tenure and, therefore, it is likely that outside directors 
benefit most from increased tenure in their early years, in which experiential learning within 
the organization helps them to feel confident to get involved in directors’ duties. However, 
while the learning curve can explain why task involvement especially increases in the 
beginning and that over time this curve shows a “decrease in increase,” it cannot explain a 
decrease in itself as our curve shows (see Figure 1). Therefore, we do not think that the 
learning curve can explain the full curve. Entrenchment, however, can explain that in the 
case of long tenure, the curve goes down. Thus, although we realize that alternative expla-
nations are possible, the entrenchment argument is theoretically plausible, is supported by 
our results, and is also consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Carpenter & Westphal, 
2001; Dane, 2010; Hambrick et al., 1993; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1998, 2003; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).
Future research could dig further into specific learning effects of directors. For instance, 
it would be interesting to examine when, what, and from whom directors learn (most); how 
they apply this acquired knowledge; and how and at what point directors learn under what 
conditions their involvement is most likely to benefit senior management strategic decision 
making. It might be, for example, that as a result of experience, directors have learned to 
consciously stay in the background on topics that they know that they are unlikely to 
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influence in order to have a larger influence on other topics. Also, it would be interesting to 
study whether longer tenured directors seek contact with other directors before board meet-
ings to build alliances upfront and, perhaps more importantly, in what way they build these 
alliances or whether they use different influence tactics. Overall, it would be worthwhile to 
garner a more general understanding of how long-tenured directors operate differently from 
newly appointed directors.
We have argued that a strong social identification with the organization might lead to 
biased perceptions that can impair outside director task involvement. We realize that 
besides social identification, there may be other factors that lead to biased perceptions of 
outside directors. Tuggle et al. (2010), for example, found that organizational performance 
and the power of the CEO affect outside directors’ focus of attention. Besides, it might be 
that past firm performance leads to biased perceptions. If organizational performance, for 
example, has declined because of previous suggestions of outside directors, it might well 
be that directors become less critical. Also, simple information overflow may lead to biased 
perceptions.
Another limitation of our work is that we focus only on one target of social identification. 
In our study, we specifically included social identification with the organization as a modera-
tor for the relationship between director tenure and director task involvement. Future research 
may look for additional moderators and consider additional targets of identification, for 
instance, with the board of directors itself (i.e., team identification), stakeholders, the corpo-
rate elite, being a CEO (if the director is a CEO elsewhere), or the specific industry (Hillman 
et al., 2008; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). Another potentially fruitful extension of our study 
may be to look at the effects of a director’s identification with being an outside director, per-
haps in combination with a director’s identification with the organization. It would be par-
ticularly interesting to study the interactive effects of simultaneously identifying with 
multiple targets. For example, identification with being a CEO elsewhere might strengthen 
the effects of organizational identification as a result of higher engagement towards the orga-
nization and higher engagement in strategic decision making, or it might interfere with the 
effects of director identification because of a lower inclination to independently assess senior 
management.
Governance research and practice may also benefit from a detailed analysis of linking 
individual-level director task involvement and effectiveness on one hand to board-level 
effectiveness, strategic decision-making quality, and firm performance on the other hand. 
This specifically calls for multilevel theorizing and analyses, thereby opening up a wide and 
virtually unexplored field for board research. Indeed, recent research on boards of directors 
explicitly acknowledges the benefits of employing multilevel approaches to flesh out the 
individual director-level determinants of board-level effectiveness (Hillman et al., 2011). An 
analysis of possible cross-level interactions between individual-level constructs (e.g., social 
identification) with the organization and board- or firm-level constructs (e.g., firm perfor-
mance) would be a worthwhile direction for investigation in this respect. In a similar vein, 
employing multilevel theorizing and analysis, board researchers may also examine the ante-
cedents and consequences from dyadic processes that operate between directors and senior 
managers.
Whereas several researchers have acknowledged the inherent weakness of investigating 
the board of directors as a monolithic entity from a board-level perspective (Finkelstein & 
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Hambrick, 1996; Hillman et al., 2008; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), to the best of our knowledge, 
this study provides the first empirical examination of director task involvement at the indi-
vidual level of analysis. Board scholars are encouraged to further examine directors as indi-
viduals to garner a better understanding of individual director functioning, interactions 
among directors, board behavior, and board effectiveness. We believe that such an under-
standing is pertinent for research on board behavior and board effectiveness.
Conclusion
In discussing the future of corporate governance research, Hambrick et al. (2008) note that 
until governance scholars understand the determinants of individual director functioning, 
they will have great difficulty in comprehending outside director functioning and linking 
board characteristics to board functioning and firm performance. By integrating insights 
from governance research and social identity theory, we have provided an analysis at the 
individual director level that supports the notion that an outside director’s task involvement 
changes over time and that social identification with the organization plays an important 
moderating role in this respect. Our findings indicate that individual director task involve-
ment is most likely to be at its highest value at intermediate levels of tenure. Outside directors 
who strongly socially identify with the organization are more likely to grow “stale in the 
saddle” at lower levels of tenure.
Notes
1. We refer to non-executive or outside directors as directors. The CEO and the other executives are referred to as 
senior management. This is in line with the literature in which the board of directors is referred to as the controlling 
body of senior management (e.g., Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010).
2. An increasing number of European countries follow the European Commission’s Recommendation 2005/162/
EC stating that for a director to be deemed independent, he or she should not have served on the (supervisory) board 
as a non-executive or supervisory director for more than 12 years.
3. This can also be seen from the modest bivariate correlation of .22 between director tenure and organizational 
identification in the current study (see Table 1), which indicates a shared variance of approximately 5%.
4. This was incorporated into law by the “Wet Balansverkorting Geldelijke Steun Volkshuisvesting” that was 
published by the Dutch government on May 31, 1995.
5. We obtained these data on November 10, 2010, from the Dutch government Web site at http://www.
rijksoverheid.nl.
6. We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing the importance of director (audit) committee member-
ship to our attention.
7. The results of these robustness checks are not reported here because of space constraints but are available on 
request from the first author.
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